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Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2007

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365853

Nash Equilibrium Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality

Lo, Kin Chung - 1999

In a Nash equilibrium, players' rationality is mutual knowledge. However, both intuition and experimental evidence … suggest that players do not know for sure the rationality of opponents. This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept … equilibrium, players do not necessarily know the rationality of opponents, but they view rationality as infinitely more likely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179636

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may or may not have access to more private information is characterized and shown to be equivalent to the set of an incomplete information version of correlated equilibrium, which we call...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153613

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2013

We define and characterize a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium: The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153614

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - 2014

The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141346

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2017

Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962810

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games : Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Bergemann, Dirk - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076008

Bergemann, Dirk - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054088

Information Design : A Unified Perspective

Bergemann, Dirk - 2018

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924207

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 487-522

A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states the payoff functions and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672033