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Waging Simple Wars : A Complete Characterization of Two-Battlefield Blotto Equilibria
Macdonell, Scott - 2016
We analyze the strategic allocation of resources across two contests as in the canonical Colonel Blotto game. In the games we study, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across two fields of battle. The larger force on each battlefield wins that battle, and the payoff to a player is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994865
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What do players know? : Nash equilibrium and Cournot's anticipation of the adaptive interpretation
Streb, Jorge M. - In: History of economic ideas : HEI 25 (2017) 1, pp. 11-34
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012127338
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Limited rationality and the strategic environment : further theory and experimental evidence
Cooper, Kristen B; Schneider, Henry S.; Waldman, Michael - In: Games and economic behavior 106 (2017), pp. 188-208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793677
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Bayesian games with rationally inattentive players
Wang, Rongyu - In: Journal of interdisciplinary economics 35 (2023) 2, pp. 139-171
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014365816
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Rational incentive equilibria
FitzRoy, Felix R. - 1980
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000164089
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Rationalizability and Nash Equilibria in Guessing Games
Seel, Christian - 2017
Games in which players aim to guess a fraction or multiple p of the average guess are known as guessing games or (p-)beauty contests. In this note, we derive a full characterization of the set of rationalizable strategies and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for such games as a function...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012962808
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Nash Equilibrium Without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality
Lo, Kin Chung - 1999
In a Nash equilibrium, players' rationality is mutual knowledge. However, both intuition and experimental evidence … suggest that players do not know for sure the rationality of opponents. This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept … equilibrium, players do not necessarily know the rationality of opponents, but they view rationality as infinitely more likely …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014179636
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Stochastic Adaptive Learning With Committed Players in Games With Strict Nash Equilibria
Funai, Naoki - 2021
In this paper, we investigate the condition under which players of an adaptive learning model, including the one of stochastic fictitious play learning, learn to follow a logit quantal response equilibrium corresponding to a strict Nash equilibrium, the one which approaches the Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323750
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Jocul ciclic – Statele Unite ale Americii versus Coreea de Nord din unghiul teoriei mutărilor strategice
Alexandru, Georgescu - In: Revista OEconomica (2011) 04
It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965563
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Correlation of types in Bayesian games
Castro, Luciano I. de - 2012 - This draft: October 22, 2012
Despite their importance, games with incomplete information and dependent types are poorly understood; only special cases have been considered and a general approach is not yet available. In this paper, we propose a new condition (named richness) for correlation of types in (asymmetric) Bayesian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009660088