In this paper we assume that strategic payoffs are Normal distribution, and discuss how the parameters of Normal distributions affect the NE payoff distribution that is also concerned by players. We find that distortions of NE payoff distributions are dominated by the distance between variances...

We characterize the time-varying effect from payoff uncertainty where the shape parameter of Weibull distribution is changed in 2 × 2 simulation-based game. We also analyze the scale effect of strategic payoffs on the Nash equilibrium payoffs in different time-varying situations. We show that...

Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game theory predictions. However, those models...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games players contribute or not to the production of a public good which is produced if and only if there are "enough" contributors. There is a plethora of equilibria in BTPG games. We experimentally test general theoretical attributes of equilibria and...

Attempts to curb illegal activity through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. Economic theory suggests that conducting audits on a predictable schedule, and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency, can undermine the effectiveness of audits. We conduct a...