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Commitments, intentions, truth and Nash equilibria
Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - 2013
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
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Believing when credible : talking about future intentions and past actions
Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - In: International journal of game theory 50 (2021) 4, pp. 867-889
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012665408
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Believing when credible : talking about future plans and past actions
Vida, Péter - 2015
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
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Learning to coordinate : co-evolution and correlated equilibrium
Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can … are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
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Information Design in Coordination Games with Risk Dominant Equilibrium Selection
Ebert, Michael - 2020
equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838305
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Nash vs. coarse correlation
Georgalos, Konstantinos; Ray, Indrajit; Gupta, Sonali Sen - 2019
We run a laboratory experiment with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes in this game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962034
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Problems with coordination in two-player games : comment on "Computational complexity and communication"
Teague, Vanessa - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 76 (2008) 6, pp. 1559-1564
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003797081
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Communication structure and coalition-proofness : experimental evidence
Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - In: European economic review : EER 94 (2017), pp. 90-102
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811981
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Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - In: International journal of game theory 52 (2023) 4, pp. 957-992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512267
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Non-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communication
Valsecchi, Irene - 2009
The paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008810295