We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of...

Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997) observe that although the Uniform consumer density is almost universally assumed in Hotelling style location games, it is more realistic to assume non-uniform distributions. Using Anderson et al.'s (1997) sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique pure...

This paper examines the behavior of adaptive agents in a stochastic dynamic version of the Hotelling's location model. We conduct an innovative agent-based simulation under the Hotelling's setting with two agents who use the Nash Q-learning mechanism for adaptation. This allows us to explore...

The paper investigates newsvendor problem for a dyadic supply chain in which both the supplier and the retailer are concerned with fairness. Nash bargaining solution is introduced as the fairness reference point and equilibrium results are derived. The effects of fairness concerns on optimal...