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Multiple behavioral rules in Cournot oligopolies
Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Ritschel, Alexander - 2019 - This version: July 2019
We show that economic decisions in strategic settings are co-determined by multiple behavioral rules. A simple model of intra-individual behavioral heterogeneity predicts testable differences depending on whether rules share a common prescription (alignment) or not (conflict), a classification...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012052579
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Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part I: Vulnerable Contingent Participators Versus Stable Contingent Cooperators
Heiner, Ronald Asher - 2002
, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296971
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Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part II: Evolutionary Dynamics & Testable Predictions
Heiner, Ronald Asher - 2002
, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010296972
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Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part II: Evolutionary Dynamics & Testable Predictions
Heiner, Ronald Asher - Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, … - 2002
, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533483
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Robust Evolution Of Contingent Cooperation In Pure One-Shot Prisoners' Dilemmas. Part I: Vulnerable Contingent Participators Versus Stable Contingent Cooperators
Heiner, Ronald Asher - Forschungsstelle zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, … - 2002
, but rather in terms of how to act with any given partner. There is a form of contingent cooperation in one-shot prisoners … fear payoff difference is less than the sum of greed and cooperation payoff differences. The adaptive capabilities just …-players' equilibrium probability of cooperating changes: depending on the relative size of fear, greed, and cooperation payoff differences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533492
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Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, … - 2023
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014487322
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Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, … - 2022
We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295651
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The Two-Person Harvard Game: An Experimental Analysis
Apesteguia, Jose - 2001
Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317676
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Strategic The Two-Person Harvard Game: An Experimental Analysis
Apesteguia, Jose - University of Bonn, Germany - 2001
Two subjects have to repeatedly choose between two alternatives, A and B, where payoffs of an A or B-choice depend on the choices made by both players in a number of previous choices. Locally, alternative A gives always more payoff than alternative B. However, in terms of overall payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968419
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When are mixed equilibria relevant?
Friedman, Daniel; Zhao, Shuchen - 2019
Mixed Nash equilibria are a cornerstone of game theory, but their empirical relevance has always been controversial. We study in the laboratory two games whose unique NE is in completely mixed strategies; other treatments include the matching protocol (pairwise random vs population...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806703