Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is...

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...

The theory of games (or game theory) is a mathematical theory that deals with the general features of competitive situations. It involves strategic thinking, and studies the way people interact while making economic policies, contesting elections and other such decisions. There are various types...

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...

<em>Baccara banque</em> is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by \(\theta\in(0,1)\). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the <em>independent cooperative equilibrium</em>. However, this...

This paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium", a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without...

It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on a players' choice of strategies. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares for the other's payoff, we can...

We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics — <em>pairwise comparison dynamics</em> — under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such...

This paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium'', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without...

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...