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Cheap talk with strategic substitutability
Venkatesh, Raghul S - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012813652
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Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information
Ganguly, Chirantan; Ray, Indrajit - In: International journal of game theory 52 (2023) 4, pp. 957-992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512267
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On modeling cheap talk in Bayesian games
Matthews, Steven A.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000841590
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On modeling cheap talk in Bayesian games
Matthews, Steven A.; Postlewaite, Andrew - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000850844
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Bayesian games with rationally inattentive players
Wang, Rongyu - In: Journal of interdisciplinary economics 35 (2023) 2, pp. 139-171
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014365816
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Incentive-driven information dissemination in two-tier supply chains
Jiang, Li; Hao, Zhongyuan - In: Manufacturing & service operations management : M & SOM 18 (2016) 3, pp. 393-413
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011516553
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Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
Gerardi, Dino (contributor); Myerson, Roger B. (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003468426
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Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games
Milchtaich, Igal - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 2, pp. 283-350
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359437
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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication
Gerardi, Dino - 2005
We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some … combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We … communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012784067
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium in "linear" Cournot models with private information about costs
Hurkens, Sjaak - In: International journal of economic theory 10 (2014) 2, pp. 203-217
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403502