We examine experimentally how humans behave when they play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash...

Some recent theoretical approaches to the question of how players might converge over time to a Nash equilibrium have assumed that the players update their beliefs about other players via Bayes' Rule. Jordan has shown in a Bayesian model of this kind that play will (theoretically) always...

We analyze the equilibria of two-person supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game is strictly competitive and has two outcomes for each player. We show that in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash...

We describe an experiment based on a repeated two-person game of incomplete information designed so that Jordan's Bayesian model of learning in games and the best response model make completely opposite predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data, using the maximum likelihood...