players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In … any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is complete rent dissipation for all but at most one player. This result is … used to show that in any sufficiently decisive anonymous standard contest, any equilibrium is an all-pay auction …

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise … the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high and intermediate … valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at …

In contest models with symmetric valuations, equilibrium payoffs are positive shares of the value of the prize. In … simple asymmetric contest in which contestants differ in the effectiveness of their efforts? For two-player contests the …