players to either overbid a standing bid or to abstain from bidding altogether. Many common forms of contest are elastic. In … any equilibrium of an elastic contest, there is complete rent dissipation for all but at most one player. This result is … used to show that in any sufficiently decisive anonymous standard contest, any equilibrium is an all-pay auction …

We characterize the equilibrium set of the n-player Hirshleifer contest with homogeneous valuations. A symmetric … in cut-throat competition, while any others become ultimately inactive. Of some conceptual interest is the observation …

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive … the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high or intermediate levels … valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at …

While the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise … the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high and intermediate … valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at …

We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …