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This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788910
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n Ï 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR)...
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This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599087
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011755972
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