Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 739
Cover Image
Quantal Response Equilibria in a Generalized Volunteer's Dilemma and Step-Level Public Goods Games with Binary Decision
Kawagoe, Toshiji - 2015
The present paper fully characterizes equilibria of a generalized Volunteer's Dilemma game, which is an integration of the volunteer's dilemma game and the step-level public goods game with binary decision. We also examined the explanatory power of a widely accepted model with bounded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028952
Cover Image
The optimal defense of network connectivity
Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian - 2015
attacker's objective is to destroy a set of nodes that disconnects the network. The conflict at each node is modeled as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405199
Cover Image
Two-Aggregate Games : Demonstration Using a Production-Appropriation Model
Cornes, Richard C.; Hartley, Roger; Tamura, Yuji - 2017
We expand the scope of the two-aggregate method by applying it to a situation where many heterogeneous players are free to contribute to both aggregates. Such situations naturally arise in various resource allocation problems. Hence our method is useful in many applications. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189512
Cover Image
Balance of power and the propensity of conflict
Herbst, Luisa; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - 2015
We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our … experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is … independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576771
Cover Image
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi - 2013
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332274
Cover Image
The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijō, Tatsuyoshi - 2013
We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009742003
Cover Image
Existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in imperfectly discriminating contests
Wasser, Cédric - 2010
We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333804
Cover Image
Contest with Attack and Defence: Does Negative Campaigning Increase or Decrease Voters’ Turnout?
Soubeyran, Raphaël - 2005
We present a general model of two players contest with two types of efforts. Contrary to the classical models of contest, where each player chooses a unique effort, and where the outcome depends on the efforts of all the players, contestants are allowed to reduce the effort of the opponent....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312400
Cover Image
A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests
Wasser, Cédric - 2014
The literature on imperfectly discriminating contests has almost exclusively focused on complete information. We study such contests assuming players have private information. We identify a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests for which findings by Athey (2001) imply the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069614
Cover Image
Focality and Asymmetry in Multi-Battle Contests
Chowdhury, Subhasish M. - 2016
This article examines behavior in two-person constant-sum Colonel Blotto games in which each player maximizes the expected total value of the battlefields won. A lottery contest success function is employed in each battlefield. Recent experimental research on such games provides only partial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984886