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model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432
whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345781
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512267
We run a laboratory experiment with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes in this game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011962034
In a coordination game such as the Battle of the Sexes, agents can condition their plays on external signals that can … are rare. Thus, even in a world of simple learning agents, coordination behavior can take on some surprising forms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515836
previous "babbling" results. -- cheap talk ; communication ; coordination ; efficient equilibrium ; babbling …Intuitively, we expect that players who are allowed to engage in costless communication before playing a game would be … foolish to agree on an inefficient equilibrium. At the same time, however, such preplay communication has been suggested as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511713
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP” (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921539
We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288137
equilibrium in symmetric (2 x 2) coordination games. Because the need to coordinate exposes players to strategic risk, we treat …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838305