Similar Search Results

Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining

Gomes, Armando R. - 2004

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944582

The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution with Simultaneous Payoff Demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019277

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2020

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572

A model of protocoalition bargaining with breakdown probability

Montero, María - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 39-56

This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316670

Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation

Pycia, Marek - 2010

We study frictionless matching and coalition formation environments. Agents have preferences over coalitions, and these … preferences, we show that there exists a core stable coalition structure in every state of nature if, and only if, agents …' preferences are pairwise-aligned in every state of nature. In particular, we establish that there is a stable coalition structure …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013137365

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