their relative size on the profitability of negotiated agreements. -- Bargaining ; Conflict ; Agency Problem … protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata … which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we …

protocol or a conflict to appropriate the surplus. In the cooperative negotiations, disagreement corresponds to a pro rata … which conflict will be preferred to negotiated agreements (and vice versa), and we derive welfare implications. Finally, we …

In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive … war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the … the relative bargaining position changes substantially. -- Bargaining ; commitment problems ; shifts in power …

option is a probabilistic conflict and a peaceful agreement is ex ante efficient. Applications include partnership, labor …-management bargaining, pretrial negotiations, and international negotiations. I compute the set of interim incentive efficient mechanisms …, the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism, as well as the neutral bargaining solution. I numerically illustrate that the …

/2; if neither offer falls into the interval, there is no settlement. Comparisons are made with other bargaining mechanisms …

We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two … veto power over any settlement. There is no depreciation during the bargaining process which involves signalling of private …

In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The … limits and show that it is efficient, but the surplus split generally differs from the Nash bargaining split. I then … construct a double limit that approximates the Nash bargaining split in the ex post surplus, but with a delay. Further, I prove …

agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an … overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on bargaining with incomplete information.The chapter begins with an … analysis of bargaining within a mechanism design framework. A modern development is provided of the classic result that, given …