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Multidimensional screening, observability and contract renegotiation

Dewatripont, Mathias; Maskin, Eric - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000893814

Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information

Dewatripont, Mathias; Maskin, Eric - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000778179

Bargaining and destructive power

Dasgupta, Partha; Maskin, Eric - 1989

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000762911

Renegotiation-proof equilibrium : reply

Farrell, Joseph - In: Journal of economic theory 49 (1989) 2, pp. 376-378

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001079573

Efficient renegotiation : proof equilibria in repeated games

Evans, Robert A. - In: Games and economic behavior 1 (1989) 4, pp. 361-369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001081565

Renegotiation in repeated games

Farrell, Joseph - In: Games and economic behavior 1 (1989) 4, pp. 327-360

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001081566

Contractual contingencies and renegotiation

Dewatripont, Mathias - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 4, pp. 704-719

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001333866

Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information

Dewatripont, Mathias - In: European economic review : EER 34 (1990) 2, pp. 311-321

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001091052

A note on "Renegotiation in repeated games" [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327-360]

Günther, Michael; Kuzmics, Christoph; Salomon, Antoine - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011913734

A note on "Renegotiation in repeated games" [Games econ. behav. 1 (1989) 327-360]

Günther, Michael - 2017

In Farrell and Maskin (1989), the authors present sufficient conditions for weakly renegotiation-proof payoffs in their Theorem 1 (p. 332). We show that a step in the proof of this theorem is not correct by giving a counterexample. Nevertheless, the sufficient conditions remain true, and we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011639580