Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement...

International agreements to protect the global environment are typically difficult to reach. In principle they should be profitable for all players involved in the negotiation. Even when they are profitable, however, they are often unstable due to the incentive to free-ride (enjoying the clean...

The negotiation theory that François de Callières (1645-1716) built promotes peace politics in the international arena. First, the paper develops the political rationality that prevailed in the 17th Century, essentially under the realm of Louis XIV, whom Callières served as a diplomat....

Rational economic agents always engage in maximizing their payoffs. The endeavor in this paper is to show that when the parties involved in the bargaining process (game) have similar discount factors and when the number of periods of the game tends to infinity or very large, then the surplus is...

Injurers often purchase the property of potential victims to avoid liability or to comply with regulations. This paper shows that injurers subject to cost-benefit standards could profit from buying out victims even if they attach no value to the victims' property. Because buyouts allow injurers...

I consider a bargaining game in which, unlike the standard economic bargaining game (e.g. Rubenstein, 1982), only one player can make proposals. I also assume that the space of proposals is finite. Thus, the game is akin to (i) a CEO's proposing a hire who must be okayed by a board of directors,...

The housing rental market offers a unique laboratory for studying price stickiness. This paper is motivated by two facts: 1. Tenants' rents are remarkably sticky even though regular and expected recontracting would, by itself, suggest substantial rent flexibility. 2. Rent stickiness varies...

Buyer-seller networks where price is determined by an ascending-bid auction are important in many economic examples such as certain real estate markets, radio spectrum sharing, and buyer-supplier networks. However, it may be that some sellers are better off not participating in the auction. We...

We provide a theoretical framework for understanding tacit agreements — agreements that are spontaneously understood even if they are not explicitly stated. To examine tacit agreements, we develop a general formal account of “virtual bargaining” — a mode of reasoning that joins elements...