In the context of bilateral bargaining,we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These...

In the present work, agreement on allocation of payments from multiple issues requires unanimous consent of all parties involved. The agents are assumed to know the aggregate payoffs but do not know their decomposition by issues. This framework applies to many real-world problems, such as the...

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogenous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders’ continuation values which are endogenous influence the sellers’ choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the...

This paper finds that banks that offered lower opening bids were rewarded with significantly lower warrant repurchase prices in transactions that raised $2.856 billion in 2009. These results were scaled by third-party consultants’ and the Congressional Oversight Panel's estimates of the...

We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...

In negotiated transactions the act of choosing trading partners and “who chooses” creates a bargaining culture that influences trading behavior. Results are presented from experimental markets in which paired buyers and sellers negotiate the repeated sale of units. Relative to a market...

Data about 233 new car models were collected, and a measure of customer success in bargaining for a new car (alpha) was created by computing the ratio between the discount received on the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) and the negotiable range (MSRP−dealer's car cost). One...

Abstract: We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with...

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast...

We consider price-fee competition in bilateral oligopolies with perfectly-divisible goods, non-expandable infrastructures, concentrated agents on both sides, and constant marginal costs. We define and characterize stable market outcomes. Buyers exclusively trade with the supplier with whom they...