multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality …). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and … allocative commitment, where allocations are determined at the point of coalition formation. We show how the timing of commitment …

frequency of the grand coalition formation, the higher efficiency, and the allocation belonging to the bargaining set is …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …

-free manner, when just three natural conditions are satisfied:(C1) A coalition is formed with positive probability if, and only if … coalition distributes the entire surplus among its members.(C3) Members of any coalition are treated symmetrically with respect … to their share expectations when the surplus of this coalition is distributed.Our analysis primarily focuses on the limit …

Given a simple game, a power configuration specifies the power of each player in each winning coalition. We introduce a … show that given this power configuration there is a coalition which is both internally and Nash stable. We consider two … investigate how infeasible coalition might affect the outcome and apply our model to the German parliament …