The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting … no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency …

This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where proposer and responder are both either … uninformed or informed about the size of the pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests … that more information induces lower (higher) price offers and acceptance thresholds when the pie is small (large). While …

-interest or envy, of one bargaining party as private information in a three period game of bargaining and preference screening and …Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been …-interested incompletely exploit their advantage. Delay in agreement occurs even if all experimentally controlled information is common …

possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size …

engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the players' valuation is assumed to be private information. The feasibility …

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can …-proof contracts and strategies for general extensive form games with incomplete information and apply our results to two-stage games …

hostage negotiations, we show that the never-concede policy of governments hinges on at least five unstated assumptions that … circumstances. Ways to bolster adherence are indicated. The chapter also investigates the influence of asymmetric information when … involving asymmetric information and terrorism are discussed. …

We consider infinite-horizon bargaining in which an uninformed seller sequentially makes a price offer to a privately … informed buyer who decides whether to accept or reject it in every bargaining round. Existing theories suggest that the …

We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982 …) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is … bargaining delay is negligible (frequent offers, so dynamic consistency holds by design), while payoff delay is significant (a …

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the …