We investigate a partially directed search market where buyers search for sellers and then final prices are determined by ultimatum game bargaining. In the search stage of this game, sellers post intervals of possible surplus splits to attract buyers and then buyers approach one seller from whom...

This research states the stylised n (more than two) players' splitting problem as a mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the properties of pertaining...

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

This paper proves that the traditional wisdom of robbing the rich for the poor will end up with just the opposite result. Evidences are given to confirm that such unjust re-distribution is happening in the real world. Welfare economists should be fired: to be replaced by wealth economists

This paper proves that Nash's exchange theory leads to inefficiency. Instead of coming to a vertex, the exchange leads to polarization. This paper questions Nash's method of exchange and suspects that his theory is not about bargaining

Nash (1950) proposes a bargaining theory. This paper proves that Nash's theory leads to unfair result. The reason for the wrong conclusion is his use of utility. This paper then recommends the old Jewish method described in Talmud for fairer solution

I show that in noncooperative bargaining between two players with risk aversion, the more risk averse player always obtains a larger equilibrium payoff, after controlling for the other sources of advantage in bargaining e.g. patience and order of bargaining. I contrast my result with that of...

We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer...