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A Theory of Sticky Rents : Search and Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Verbrugge, Randal - 2017
The housing rental market offers a unique laboratory for studying price stickiness. This paper is motivated by two facts: 1. Tenants' rents are remarkably sticky even though regular and expected recontracting would, by itself, suggest substantial rent flexibility. 2. Rent stickiness varies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955614
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Sequential bargaining with pure common values
Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
We study the alternating-offers bargaining problem of assigning an indivisible and commonly valued object to one of two players in return for some payment among players. The players are asymmetrically informed about the object's value and have veto power over any settlement. There is no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373492
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Alternating‐offer bargaining with the global games information structure
Tsoy, Anton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 869-931
In this study, I examine the alternating‐offer bilateral bargaining model with private correlated values. The correlation of values is modeled via the global games information structure. I focus on the double limits of perfect Bayesian equilibria as offers become frequent and the correlation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856724
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Bargaining and reputation in search markets
Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - 2010
In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an … ; Reputation ; Search ; Dynamic Matching ; War-of-Attrition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665719
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Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides
Schweinzer, Paul - 2006
We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373493
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Bargaining with Incomplete Information : Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations
Konrad, Kai A. - 2014
This paper considers evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in a take-it-or-leave-it offer bargaining game with incomplete information. We find responders reject offers which yield a higher positive material payoff than their outside option. Proposers, in turn, make more attractive offers than...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048099
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Stability with One-Sided Incomplete Information
Bikhchandani, Sushil - 2017
Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non …-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for … every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012965814
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Perfect Sequential Equilibrium in Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Khan, Muhammad Nazmul - 2022
I derive a refinement of sequential equilibria of a noncooperative bargaining game when one player has incomplete information about the time preference of the other player. I show that if the types for this latter player are drawn from some totally ordered and finite lattice, Grossman &...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014237072
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On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information
Tsai, Tsung-Sheng; Yang, C.C - 2009
This paper studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn's (1989) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Our devised model essentially blends Spence's signaling and the coalition formation of majoritarian bargaining. The main findings include: (i) oversized coalitions may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061378
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Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information : An Experimental Study of the Bonus Procedure
Parco, James E.; Rapoport, Amnon - 2008
The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by providing a bonus for both traders if, and only if, an agreement is reached. Brams and Kilgour (1996) proved that there is a unique level of bonus, namely, half the difference...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028811