Showing 1 - 10 of 2,643
We consider a model of decentralized bargaining among three parties. Parties meet one-on-one after being randomly matched, and can sell or buy votes to one another. The party with a majority of the votes can decide to implement its preferred policy or extend negotiations to capture additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159665
We report the results of an experimental investigation of the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power, close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141360
Outcomes under the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model are investigated when proposers distribute benefits versus imposing costs under an experimental design where predicted outcomes are theoretically isomorphic, absent reference dependent preferences. Initial experimental sessions showed greater...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925361
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578203
This paper proposes a mechanism to overcome the possibility that political parties may block the nomination of High-Court judges when the Parliament is involved in their nomination and theirmandate expires on a fixed date. This possibility arises when the default option is that the judge whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010503329
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous `disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434323
legislation when they can form a decisive majority coalition with like-minded governments. When a compromise can only be struck by … a policy dispersed majority, however, governments have incentives to delay legislation in the expectation of … find, however, that as the time spent in negotiations increases, opportunity costs become important and legislation is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014153786
This article examines how decision makers in the EU legislative process reach consensual decisions through the mechanism of ‘implicit voting’. I introduce a spatial model of coalitional bargaining using a utility function incorporating decision makers’ considerations of the policy gains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164064
Agenda-setting power is a double-edged sword that increases the likelihood that an agent is chosen to be a proposer, but may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081465
While the theoretical literature on non-cooperative legislative bargaining has grown voluminous, there is little empirical work attempting to test a key prediction in this literature: proposal power is valuable. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by investigating the role of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013233902