Intermediaries may bargain with several upstream providers on behalf of consumers who do not directly pay for consumption, such as an insurer bargaining with hospitals. We show that the common Nash- in-Nash solution, while useful for estimation, can predict Nash overpricing: prices that exceed...

We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or nonalcoholic. To do this, our...

In 2005, competition was introduced in part of the hospital market in the Netherlands. Using a unique dataset of transactions and list prices between hospitals and insurers in the years 2005 and 2006, we estimate the influence of buyer and seller concentration on the negotiated prices. First, we...

The supersizing phenomenon where menu prices for large fast food portions appear to be well below their marginal production costs is of considerable scholarly and policy interest. This article examines a monopoly facing demand functions where the single-crossing condition is violated. We find a...

The supersizing phenomenon where menu prices for large fast food portions appear to be well below their marginal production costs is of considerable scholarly and policy interest. This article examines a monopoly facing demand functions where the single-crossing condition is violated. We find a...

We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or nonalcoholic. To do this, our...

External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals based on prices of identical products in foreign countries. Suppose a foreign country (F) negotiates prices with a pharmaceutical firm while a home country (H) can either negotiate independently or implement ER based on the...

Executive-legislative bargaining operates with cost-benefit tradeoffs. Presidents possess several material options in leveraging Congressional support but also marshal these scarce resources. We argue presidents should strategically grant requests of members of Congress for a range of executive...