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The bargaining set and coalition formation

Shimomura, Ken-ichi - In: International journal of economic theory 18 (2022) 1, pp. 16-37

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013161973

Reactive and semi-reactive bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation

Naumova, Natalia - In: International game theory review 22 (2020) 3, pp. 1-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582726

Bargaining set with endogenous leaders : a convergence result

Hervés-Estévez, Javier; Moreno-García, Emma - In: Economics letters 166 (2018), pp. 10-13

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011375

Negotiation across multiple issues

Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191

Patience and ultimatum in bargaining

Segendorff, Björn - 2002

This study investigates in a two-stage two-player model how the decision to make an ultimatum and how much to demand depends on the impatience of the agents and the pie uncertainty. First, players simultaneously decide on their ultimatums. If the ultimatum(s) are compatible then the player(s)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009502219

Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options : conference paper

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338950

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

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