Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

In the context of a stylized New Keynesian model, we explore the interaction between imperfect knowledge about the state of the economy and the zero lower bound. We show that optimal policy under discretion near the zero lower bound responds to signals about an increase in the equilibrium real...

This paper addresses whether non-uniqueness of equilibrium is a substantive problem for the analysis of fiscal policy in New-Keynesian (NK) models at the zero lower bound (ZLB). There would be a substantive problem if there were no compelling way to select among different equilibria that give...

This paper addresses whether non-uniqueness of equilibrium is a substantive problem for the analysis of fiscal policy in New-Keynesian (NK) models at the zero lower bound (ZLB). There would be a substantive problem if there were no compelling way to select among different equilibria that give...