Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...

Civil servants have a reputation for being lazy. However, people's personal experiences with civil servants frequently run counter to this stereotype. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive...

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...

Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens' personal experiences with civil servants appear to be significantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers differ in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts...

The main aim of this paper is to study the extent to which the project based organization (PBO) and the latent organization determine the actual behavior of actors in a project based industry and how this is mediated by the types of contracts and rewarding practices these organizational forms...

Organizational memory is not just the stock of knowledge about how to do things, but also of the expectations of organizational members vis-à-vis each other and the organization as a whole. The central argument of this paper is that this second type of organizational memory – organizational...

This paper reviews an investigation into the application of retention bonuses and labor market allowances in the central government sector in the Netherlands. On average, the supplements amount to approximately one (gross) monthly salary. They mainly accrue to males, who are highly educated,...