In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky's (J Econ Theory 71:44- 74, 1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive...

In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous 'societal cover' consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

We study the effects of linking constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. An exogenous “link-constraining system” specifies the admissible links. It is assumed that each player may initiate links only with players within a specified set of players, thus restricting the...