We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks, with separate local and long-distance markets, allowing for various degrees of symmetry between carriers. Assuming two part pricing, we show that effective competition can be achieved with simple regulations involving mandatory...

We develop a model of competition between interconnected networks, that allows for carriers to differ in size. Under two-part pricing, we show that because of asymmetry the larger network will always prefer a reciprocal interconnection charge be set at cost. For sufficiently large asymmetry the...

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the US and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a...

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyze interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of...