This paper seeks to understand the economic impact of centralized and decentralized ownership structures and their corresponding pricing and investment strategies on transportation network performance and social welfare for travelers. In a decentralized network economic system, roads are owned...

We study the capacity investment strategy of a manufacturer who sells his product on a live-streaming shopping platform. The manufacturer first decides the production capacity, then the platform decides her commission, and finally the manufacturer sets the retail price. The platform has an...

PurposeThe aim of this paper is to study the impact of the questions and answers (Q&A) between investors and enterprises from the China stock exchange investor interactive platforms on the total factor productivity (TFP) of enterprises.Design/methodology/approachTo show how the interaction...

Based on the frictional matching framework, the paper provides a theoretical model for the two-sided platform in which the number of participants on both sides of the platform and the source of network externalities are endogenously determined. The platform is shown to exhibit both positive...

Should the FTC have allowed Zillow to acquire its foremost rival, Trulia? It is increasingly well-accepted that digital platforms tend toward dominance in their immediately adjacent relevant-product markets. Google, for example, has long held a majority share of the markets for general-search...

We study a platform's design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers' competition by charging them transaction fees that increase with sales revenue, and...

We study a platform's design of membership and transaction fees when sellers compete and buyers cannot observe the prices and features of goods without incurring search costs. The platform alleviates sellers' competition by charging them transaction fees that increase with sales revenue, and...

We study the formation of mutual insurance networks in a model where every agent who obtains more resources gives a fixed amount of resources to all agents who have obtained less resources. The low resource agent must be directly linked to the high resource agent to receive this transfer. We...

We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make...