known to the buyers. We model a monopoly's optimal pricing strategy to “screen” buyers' network information: their … – complete information pricing and uniform pricing – to shed light on the value of screening and the value of network in …

information together will lead to a downward distortion for all consumers in the quantities provided. Despite the overall downward …

-market externalities. Said platform has no private information, does not set the commodity's price and can only charge trading parties for …

, we investigate the optimal targeting strategy in the presence of information asymmetry. We provide precise indices for …

coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple … consumers. network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria …. -- two-sided markets ; network externalities ; platform competition ; coordination …

coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple … consumers' network choices. Enough heterogeneity in reservation values is necessary for existence of these asymmetric equilibria …

interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can … equilibria product differentiation is endogenized by the network choices of consumers. Heterogeneity of consumers is necessary …

benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other … platform to convince customers that the two sides will coordinate on joining it. We find that the degree of the coordination … access fees and the size of the platform. A slight increase in the coordination bias may induce the advantaged platform to …

equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem which is prevalent …