The structures of social interaction affect individual behavior and economic performance in important ways. This leads us to ask: does the architecture of social interaction exhibit particular patterns and are these patterns stable over time? We examine interaction among economists by looking at...

We consider a non-cooperative model of information networks where communication is costly and not fully reliable. We examine the nature of Nash networks and efficient networks. <p>We find that if the society is large, and link formation costs are moderate, Nash networks as well as efficient...</p>

When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question....

This chapter shows that networks can have large and differentiated effects on behavior and then argues that social and economic pressures facilitate the formation of heterogeneous networks. Thus networks can play an important role in understanding the wide diversity in human behavior and in...

In a Cournot oligopoly, prior to choosing quantity, each firm has an opportunity to form pair-wise collaborative links with other firms. These pair-wise links lower costs of production of the firms which form a link and, if there are knowledge spillovers, also lower costs of other firms which...

In a variety of contexts - ranging from public goods provision to information collection - a player's well-being depends on own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbors. We provide a framework to analyze such strategic interactions when neighborhood structure, modeled in...

This paper develops a simple model to examine the interaction between partner choice and individual behavior in games of coordination. An important ingredient of our approach is the way we model partner choice: we suppose that a player can establish ties with other players by unilaterally...