This paper examines the effects of underwriter networks in the market of securitized products. The complexity and opacity of securitized products increase the value of information gathered and disseminated to the market by central underwriters. However, securitized deals have long performance...

We provide an empirical analysis of the investments' network of investors and startups, using original data from the entrepreneurial finance setting in California. We also propose, and calibrate a two-mode random network formation model. We show that an essential mechanism of the entrepreneurial...

By design, the Bitcoin protocol has a low throughput. The Lightning Network (LN) is a layer-two solution built to increase throughput by cryptographically securing commitments to transactions and only occasionally converting cumulative balances into on-chain transactions. LN channels enable...

The heterogeneous connections model is a generalization of the homogeneous connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in which the intrinsic value of each connection is set by a discrete, positive and symmetric function that depends solely on the types of the two end agents. Core periphery...

Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project's quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the...

This paper explores the manner in which the structure of a social network constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained among its members. We assume that any distribution of value across the network must be stable with respect to coalitional deviations, and that players can form a...

The social and economic networks literature commonly uses different measures to capture various notions of centrality. Given the structural features of a network, there is limited consensus on how to select the appropriate centrality measure. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of...

We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination and anti-coordination games, varying the...

We develop a model of social preferences for network games and study its predictions in a local public goods game with multiple equilibria. The key feature of our model is that players' social preferences are heterogeneous. This gives room for disagreement between players about the “right”...

I study social learning in networks with information acquisition and choice. Bayesian agents act in sequence, observe the choices of their connections, and acquire information via sequential search. Complete learning occurs if search costs are not bounded away from zero and the network is...