Recent theoretical models of network competition with call externalities demonstrate strategic incentives of incumbent providers to reduce receiver benefits in rival network by excessive off-net pricing. Such anti-competitive pricing practices have a potentially damaging impact on financial...

In this paper we utilize discrete choice experiment method to identify and measure switching costs and network effects in mobile telephony in Poland. Based on hypothetical choices consumers make we construct a conditional random parameters multinomial logit model to analyze their preferences. In...

We study the dynamics of usage intensity of second-generation cellular telephony over the diffusion curve. Specifically, we address two questions: First, can we draw conclusions about the underlying drivers of technology diffusion by studying usage intensity? Second, what is the effect of high...

I develop a structural demand model for mobile telephone service, which facilitates the identification of network effects and compatibility between networks. Network effects are measured by the dependence of consumer willingness to pay on the installed base of subscribers. Compatibility is...

We investigate the implications of Network Neutrality regulation for Internet fragmentation. We model a two-sided market, where Content Providers (CPs) and consumers interact through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and CPs sell consumers' attention to advertisers. Under Network Neutrality, CPs...

In this paper we investigate whether markets with heterogeneous network externalities can belocked-in by old technologies even if superior technologies are available. Heterogeneous networkexternalities are present when some consumers care more about the size of the market share of agood than...

We discuss network neutrality regulation of the Internet in the context of a two-sided market model. Platforms sell broadband Internet access services to residential consumers and may set fees to content and application providers on the Internet. When access is monopolized, cross-group...

This paper provides a simple model of two-sided platforms, in which one side (W) values not just the quantity (i.e. number) of users on the other side (M), but also their average quality in some dimension. In this context, platforms might find it profitable to exclude low-quality users on side...