There is a growing international consensus that standard competition law is inadequate for addressing the panoply of competition problems arising in digital platform markets. Alongside a proposal for ex ante regulation in this arena, the European Commission is considering the introduction of a...

We analyze mixed bundling in two-sided markets where installed base effects are present and find that the pricing structure deviates from traditional bundling as well as the standard two-sided markets literature - we determine prices on both sides fall with bundling. Mixed bundling acts as a...

Platform businesses that facilitate connections between different stakeholders play an increasingly prominent role in the economy. In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a seminal decision, Ohio et. al. v. American Express, on the analysis of antitrust issues involving these sorts of businesses....

This paper presents a model in which a monopoly platform not only operates a marketplace intermediating direct transactions between consumers and third-party sellers, but also sells its first-party products at the marketplace, which is designated herein as platform encroachment. When...

As technology and interconnectivity have continued to flourish, so too has an important and complex form of enterprise: the platform. Services like Uber, Google Search, Hulu, and American Express cater to distinct but deeply-interdependent “sides” of customers that derive value or revenues...

We study platforms competing in commissions on revenues of sellers engaged in monopolistic competition, as the app providers on the app stores of iPhones and Android devices. Free entry of sellers on each platform generates multihoming superstars and a long tail of singlehoming sellers....

We consider a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. The incumbent platform enjoys a focal position such that consumers expect other consumers to join it, while the entrant platform may enjoy a quality advantage. We examine the effect of an antitrust policy that...

The mobile app economy comprises two distinct platform markets through which app developers make revenue: app platform and ad platform markets. App sales are facilitated by app platforms, whereas advertising matching is intermediated by ad platforms. Cross-market platform competition exists,...

Strategic interactions between two-sided platforms depend not only on whether their decision variables are strategic complements or substitutes as for one-sided firms, but also - and crucially so - on whether or not the platforms subsidize one side of the market in equilibrium. For example, with...

This paper analyzes the effects of tying arrangements on market competition and social welfare in two-sided markets when economic agents can engage in multi-homing; that is, they can participate in multiple platforms in order to reap maximal network benefits. The model shows that tying induces...