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Economics and Computation : An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division
Rothe, Jörg (ed.) - 2016 - 1st ed. 2016
theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision … making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both … noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012397920
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Economics and Computation : An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division
Rothe, Jörg (ed.); Rothe, Irene (illustration) - 2024 - Second edition
Playing, Voting, and Dividing -- Playing Successfully: Noncooperative Game Theory -- Cooperative Game Theory -- Voting … -- Multiwinner Voting -- Judgment Aggregation -- Fair Division: Cake-Cutting - Fair Division of Divisible Goods -- Fair Division of … Indivisible Goods. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014565987
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Economics and computation : an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division
Rothe, Jörg (contributor); Rothe, Irene (contributor) - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317619
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Strategy-proof and anonymous allocation rules of indivisible goods : a new characterization of Vickrey allocation rule
Serizawa, Shigehiro (contributor) - 2006
firms, or imagine that a government distributes equally divided lands to households. We show that the Vickrey allocation … rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity and individual rationality. -- strategy …-proofness ; anonymity ; indivisible good ; Vickrey allocation rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321348
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Strategy-Proof and Fair Assignment is Wasteful
Martini, Giorgio - 2015
I prove that there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. This strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening their assumption of ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021494
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Characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro; Ching, Stephen - 2010
We consider the problem of allocating infinitely divisible commodities among a group of agents. Especially, we focus on the case where there are several commodities to be allocated, and agents have continuous, strictly convex, and separable preferences. In this paper, we establish that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003929953
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Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
Ashlagi, Itai; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Social choice and welfare 38 (2012) 3, pp. 531-542
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009549691
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Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - In: Journal of economic theory 158 (2015), pp. 165-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548637
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Strategy-proof rule in probabilistic allocation problem of an indivisible good and money
Hashimoto, Kazuhiko - 2015
We consider the problem of probabilistically allocating a single indivisible good among agents when monetary transfers are allowed. We construct a new strategy-proof rule, called the second price trading rule, and show that it is second best efficient. Furthermore, we give the second price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010504686
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Strategyproof single unit award rules
Pápai, Szilvia - In: Social choice and welfare 18 (2001) 4, pp. 785-798
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001614221