We construct a political equilibrium in which employers and labour unions bargain over labour contracts, wage-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be accepted by the majority of voters. We show that the...

We investigate experimentally whether collective choice matters for individual attitudes to ambiguity. We consider a two-urn Ellsberg experiment: one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize, the other an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either individually or in groups of...

Research on collective provision of private goods has focused on distributional considerations. This paper studies a class of problems of decision under uncertainty in which an efficiency argument for collective choice emerges from the mathematics of aggregating individual payoffs. Consider...

The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct candidate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. This paper studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values...

We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have generalized Hurwicz preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are "almost-objectively uncertain" in the sense...

We consider collective decisions under uncertainty, when agents have "generalized Hurwicz" preferences, a broad class allowing many different ambiguity attitudes, including subjective expected utility preferences. We consider sequences of acts that are “almost-objectively uncertain” in the...

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the persistent lawlessness attitude observed in some transition and developing countries where an overall increase in the quality of institutions is recorded. The mechanism of information diffusion on institutional quality is explored using a model...

We construct a political equilibrium in which employers and labour unions bargain over labour contracts, wage-earners and profit-earners lobby the government for taxation and labour market regulation, and labour market legislation must be accepted by the majority of voters. We show that the...