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This paper overviews theoretical and empirical contributions that study political borders from an economic perspective. It reviews theories of the number and size of nations focused on the trade-off between economies of scale in public-good provision and heterogeneity of preferences over public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290075
Unlike the previous literature on mass policy feedback, the present paper argues that a negative message embodied in public policy may foster or dampen political participation depending on social group affiliation. The policy change we use to examine the effect of biased policy (a negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011586205
This paper overviews theoretical and empirical contributions that study political borders from an economic perspective. It reviews theories of the number and size of nations focused on the trade-off between economies of scale in public-good provision and heterogeneity of preferences over public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013473678
This paper develops an expanded framework for social planning in which the existence of coercion is explicitly acknowledged. Key issues concern the precise definition of coercion for individuals and in the aggregate, its difference from redistribution, and its incorporation into normative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003791813
We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457829
We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462767
We consider collective decision problems where some agents have private information about alternatives and others don't. Voting takes place under strategy-proof rules. Prior to voting, informed agents may or may not disclose their private information, thus eventually influencing the preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903392
We study two related versions of the no-impatience postulate in the context of transitive and reflexive relations on infinite utility streams which are not necessarily complete. Both are excluded by the traditional (weak) anonymity axiom. We show explicit social welfare relations satisfying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057648