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Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003626036
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002145556
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132440
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principle-agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to non-optimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012713812
Elected representatives have little incentive to pursue the interests of those electing them once they are elected. This well-known principal agent problem leads, in a variety of theories of government, to nonoptimally large levels of government expenditure. An implication is that budgetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166034