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Why is there no revolution in North-Korea? : the political economy of revolution revisited
Apolte, Thomas - 2010
In this paper the political economy of revolutions is revisited, as it has been developed and applied in a number of publications by Acemoglu and Robinson. We criticize the fact that these authors abstract from collective-action problems and focus on inequality of income or wealth instead. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374793
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Who is the Enemy?
Epstein, Gil S.; Gang, Ira N. - 2021
We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319123
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Electoral competition under media influence
Bräuer, Wolfgang - 1998
current policy choice. Deviating from (exogenous) traditional party policy reduces the credibility of a party in the eyes of … voters of both parties. They get either desensitised or over-sensitised in respect to party credibility which alters the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441433
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Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution
Perez, Wilson - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324912
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Group contests with internal conflict and power asymmetry
Choi, Jay Pil; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Jaesoo - 2014
We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members'efforts, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467392
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Exclusivity of Groups in Contests
Send, Jonas - 2021
I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323852
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Divide and conquer : noisy communication in networks, power, and wealth distribution
Pérez Oviedo, Wilson - 2004
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
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The Collective Action Problem : Within-group Cooperation and Between-group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game
Cheikbossian, Guillaume - 2008
This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking model with two groups where within-group cooperation is supported through the use of a double-edged trigger...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219131
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Rally post-terrorism
Chen, Shuai - 2022
, in order to mitigate concerns over selectivity of terrorism in particular areas. I empirically show that both terrorism … compare such political changes after successful attacks to those after failed attacks of the same type. I find that post-terrorism … acquisition as alternative explanations. This paper first empirically analyzes the driver of the rally effect of terrorism by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013166156
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Democracy, Autocracy and the Likelihood of International Conflict
Tangerås, Thomas - 2008
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320243