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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei (contributor);  … - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397473
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Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042
-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
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An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2008
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053961
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Fairness and efficiency in a random assignment : three impossibility results
Nesterov, Alexander - 2014
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227
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Coalition and Core in Resource Allocation and Exchange
Zhang, Jun - 2020
In discrete exchange economies with possibly redundant and joint ownership, we propose new core notions in the conventional flavor by regarding endowments as rights to consume or trade with others. Our key idea is to identify self-enforcing coalitions and to redistribute their redundant property...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839675
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On Two Competing Mechanisms for Priority-based Allocation Problems with General Weak Priorities
Ishida, Wataru - 2019
We consider a priority based allocation problem with general weak priorities. We focus on two strategy-proof mechanisms: the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism and the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism. We give two conditions on weak priority structures whereby each of the DA mechanism and TTC...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900300
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Gridlock and Inefficient Policy Instruments
Austen-Smith, Michael David - 2019
Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902826
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On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-Based Allocation Problems
Rong, Kang - 2020
For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012853373