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Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability
Andersson, Tommy; Ehlers, Lars H.; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 753-777
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
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Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Ehlers, Lars H.; Westkamp, Alexander - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1009-1042
-proof mechanism that is constrained efficient, i.e. that always produces a stable matching that is not Pareto-dominated by another … stable matching. We characterize all solvable priority structures satisfying the following two restrictions: (A) Either there …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937252
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An impossibility theorem in matching problems
Takagi, Shohei (contributor);  … - 2006
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397473
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Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
Barberà, Salvador - 2015
(partially) group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013031379
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Nash Implementation of Stable Solutions in Many-to-One Matching Problems : The Case with No Complementarities
Korpela, Ville - 2014
We study Nash implementation in many-to-one matching problems also known as college admission problems [Gale and … although subsolutions of the stable many-to-one matching rule do not in general satisfy no veto power, monotonicity is not only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157176
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Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies Without Money : Matching, Division and House Allocation
Barberà, Salvador - 2015
We observe that three salient solutions to matching, division and house allocation problems are not only (partially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013033174
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School Choice : Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
Jaramillo, Paula - 2017
We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586
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An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems
Takagi, Shohei; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2008
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that efficient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing efficiency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014053961
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986