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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority
Falconieri, Sonia - 2001
This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324782
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The impact of lobbying on the allocation of political authority
Falconieri, Sonia - 2001
This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317444
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Sequential advocacy
Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert A. J.; Swank, Otto H. - 2003
The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats … one cause yields full information collection atminimum costs. This provides a rationale for advocacy in politicaland … judicial systems. In this paper, we provide a rationale forthe sequential nature of information collection in advocacysystems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326399
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Transparency in parliamentary voting
Benesch, Christine; Bütler, Monika; Hofer, Katharina E. - 2015
We use a change in the voting procedures of one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the voting behavior of its members. Until 2013, the Council of States (Ständerat) had voted by a show of hands. While publicly observable at the time of the vote,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011411279
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Politics With(Out) Coase
Luppi, Barbara - 2012
Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113867
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Cooperatives Vs. Outside Ownership
Hart, Oliver - 2008
, agents are assumed to have asymmetric information, which rules out recontracting. We have two main results. First, in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771164
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Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections
Barelli, Paulo - 2020
We study the problem of aggregating private information in elections with two or more alternatives. We characterize … environments where information can be aggregated asymptotically by a sequence of equilibria of voting games as the electorate grows … large and explore the implications for the information structure. Information aggregation is generically possible when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852242
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Optimal Prudential Regulation of Banks and the Political Economy of Supervision
Tressel, Thierry - 2014
We consider a moral hazard economy in banks and production to study how incentives for risk taking are affected by the quality of supervision. We show that low interest rates may generate excessive risk taking. Because of a pecuniary externality, the market equilibrium may not be optimal and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051596
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Rational Polarization
Dorst, Kevin - 2021
Predictable polarization is everywhere. We can often predict the different directions that people’s opinions—including our own—will shift over time. Empirical studies suggest that this is so whenever evidence is ambiguous, a fact that’s often thought to demonstrate human bias or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212996