This paper analyzes a boundedly rational decision maker who is uncertain about his preference and faces the following trade-off: adding a good to the choice set has a positive option value but increases the complexity of the choice problem. The increased complexity is modeled as a reduction of...

Standard choice theory assumes that the choice set is known to the decision-maker in advance. In contrast, we develop a model in which alternatives are examined sequentially and decision-makers exhibit `satis cing' attitudes. The proposed procedure includes the standard model of choice as a...

We introduce and study the problem of manipulation of choice behavior. In a class of two-stage models of decision making, with the agent's choices determined by three "psychological variables," we imagine that a subset of these variables can be selected by a "manipulator." To what extent does...

We introduce and study the problem of manipulation of choice behavior. In a class of two - stage models of decision making, with the agent's choices determined by three 'psychological variables', we imagine that a subset of these variables can be selected by a 'manipulator'. To what extent does...

Public choice theory has originally been motivated by the need to correct the asymmetry, widespread in traditional welfare economics, between the motivational assumptions of market participants and policymakers: Those who played the game of politics should also be considered rational and...

Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That’s what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who...