Showing 1 - 10 of 147
the budgeting process is the main driving force in explaining differences in fiscal outcomes and that budgetary numeric … rules can be an active long-run constraint only if the budgeting process is transparent enough. The model does not only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322596
This paper studies the strategic foundations of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991), also called the second version of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice functions over the domain of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323146
This paper studies the internal organizational design of politicalinstitutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a legislature ascomposed of two bodies: the floor and an informational committee. Thefloor has the (formal) power to choose the policy to be implemented.The policy outcome is ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324782
We study a politician's choice for state or private control of banks. The choice trades of lobbying contributions against social welfare, weighted by political accountability.Politicians facing few constraints prefer state control to maximize their rents. As state banks are less efficient, at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325737
This note provides a methodological contribution to the allocation of joint revenues obtained from passepartouts. In a passepartout system a group of service providers offers a passepartout that allows its owners the use of specified services for an unlimited number of times during a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325856
A competitive rent-seeking club (CRSC) offers its members the chance of winning a prize (status, position, privilege) by being selected, typically, by a civil servant or a politician. The selector replaces in our setting the usual contest success function; instead of determining the winner on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335991
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Aufteilung eines Budgets auf mehrere öffentliche Güter mittels einer Abstimmung. Hierzu betrachten wir Abstimmungsregeln, unter denen jeder Agent eine Budgetaufteilung vorschlägt und dann aus diesen Vorschlägen eine Budgetaufteilung (Allokation) bestimmt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011889538
Over time the international development community has advocated various development paradigms, but countries following these paradigms have often performed poorly. I provide an explanation for this poor performance. In my model the political leader of a developing country chooses a policy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430081
This paper overviews theoretical and empirical contributions that study political borders from an economic perspective. It reviews theories of the number and size of nations focused on the trade-off between economies of scale in public-good provision and heterogeneity of preferences over public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290075
the budgeting process is the main driving force in explaining differences in fiscal outcomes and that budgetary numeric … rules can be an active long-run constraint only if the budgeting process is transparent enough. The model does not only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003757398