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This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320243
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324912
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002071407
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such regime changes are often followed by redistribution to the poor at the expense of the former elite. We argue that the reason why the elite may have to resort to full-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175750
We develop a theory of political transitions inspired in part by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social unrest or revolution and this may force the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014175752
The aim of this note is to discuss previously unnoticed stability properties of majoritarian decision making. We study collective decisions problems that can be described in terms of symmetric games satisfying various regularity conditions. We show that restricting the objecting power to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166245
We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915720
We propose a theory of endogenous polarization where a political elite strategically initiates conflicts between groups of people to polarize society and strengthen the elite's power. In the model, interactions between two groups of people result in stochastic gains, which are taxed by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241833
In this chapter, we assess recent contributions of computational models to the study of politics. We focus primarily on agent-based models developed by economists and political scientists. These models address collective action problems, questions related to institutional design and performance,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024376
International economic sanctions have become increasingly important as alternatives to military conflict since the end of the Cold War. This chapter surveys various approaches to the study of economic sanctions in both the economics and international relations literatures. Sanctions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024402