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Economics and Computation : An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division

Rothe, Jörg (ed.) - 2016 - 1st ed. 2016

theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision … making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both … noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012397920

Economics and Computation : An Introduction to Algorithmic Game Theory, Computational Social Choice, and Fair Division

Rothe, Jörg (ed.); Rothe, Irene (illustration) - 2024 - Second edition

Playing, Voting, and Dividing -- Playing Successfully: Noncooperative Game Theory -- Cooperative Game Theory -- Voting … theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision … making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014565987

Economics and computation : an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division

Rothe, Jörg (contributor); Rothe, Irene (contributor) - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011317619

When is voting optimal?

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers' posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper sheds...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457829

When is voting optimal?

Ben-Yashar, Ruth; Danziger, Leif - 2014

We consider a framework where the optimal decision rule determining the collective choice depends in a simple way on the decision makers’ posterior probabilities of a particular state of nature. Nevertheless, voting is generally an inefficient way to make collective choices and this paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010462767