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A committee divided into two factions is considering a costly project. Support of both factions is required for the project to be approved. As long as the decision is delayed, the committee can learn which faction benefits from the project. At the equilibrium, one of the factions effectively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013238586
Using a laboratory experiment, we study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good that is provided if and only if the fraction of contributors reaches a certain threshold. We jointly vary the size of the group, the cost of contributing, the required threshold, and the framing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357124
Using a laboratory experiment, we study the incentives of individuals to contribute to a public good that is provided if and only if the fraction of contributors reaches a certain threshold. We jointly vary the size of the group, the cost of contributing, the required threshold, and the framing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357386
How do voting institutions affect incentives of committees to vote expressively? We model the problem of a committee, whose members have different depths of reasoning, that decides whether to approve an ethical proposal. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, but all...
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A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have different depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014095232