Showing 1 - 10 of 596
We consider the problem of allocating several types of indivisible goods when preferences are separable and monetary transfers are not allowed. Our finding is that the coordinatewise application of strategy-proof and non-wasteful rules yields a strategy-proof rule with the following efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250132
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997704
We study the performance of the Quadratic Voting (QV) mechanism proposed by Lalley and Weyl (2016) in finite populations of various sizes using three decreasingly analytic but increasingly precise methods with emphasis on examples calibrated to the 2008 gay marriage referendum in California....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904427
We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357437
We analyze bankruptcy problems with an indivisible object, where real owners and outside traders want to allocate an indivisible object among them with monetary compensation. The object might be a company that has gone bankrupt or a house left by a parent who has died, and so on. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434024
Due to computing and communication facilities, formal procedures, often referred to as "algorithms", are now extensively used in public, economic and social areas. These procedures, currently at the forefront of criticisms, share some features with mechanisms as defined by economists, following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822644
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous objects to agents with money, where the number of agents exceeds that of objects. Each agent can receive at most one object, and some objects may remain unallocated. A bundle is a pair consisting of an object and a payment. An agent's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418154
Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" quadratic in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975457
We consider the problem of allocating a single object to the agents with payments. Agents have preferences that are not necessarily quasi-linear. We characterize the class of rules satisfying pairwise strategy-proofness and non-imposition by the priority rule. Our characterization result remains...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013350780
This online appendix proves the central result in Lalley and Weyl (Forthcoming). The full text PDF for "Qaudratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014126996