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Why Lying Pays : Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests
Kawagoe, Toshiji; Takizawa, Hirokazu - 2005
We conduct experiments of a cheap-talk game with incomplete information in which one sender type has an incentive to misrepresent her type. Although that Sender type mostly lies in the experiments, the Receiver tends to believe the Sender's messages. This confirms "truth bias" reported in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066107
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Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
Schipper, Burkhard - 2005
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366551
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Ex-post regret learning in games with fixed and random matching : the case of private values
Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
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Ex-Post Regret Learning in Games with Fixed and Random Matching : The Case of Private Values
Saran, Rene - 2010
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
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Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers
Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Joerg; … - 2005
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366554
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Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning
Miettinen, Topi - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 50 (2012) 1, pp. 193-222
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009533446
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A characterization of melioration in game theoretic frameworks
Apesteguia, Jose - 2001
The theory of melioration, originally formulated for individual decision-making contexts, is formally extended to a game theoretic framework. This paper proves the existence of a distribution that is a melioration strategy on the part of all players. Further, the question of stability of such a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539636
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Satisficing in strategic environments : a theoretical approach and experimental evidence
Güth, Werner (contributor); Levati, M. Vittoria (contributor) - 2008
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003770444
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Communication and coordination : the case of boudedly rational players
Ellingsen, Tore (contributor); Östling, Robert (contributor) - 2007 - Rev. October 13, 2009
We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of pre-play communication in symmetric 2×2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003586295
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Stochastically stable implementation
Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 3 (2012) 1/2, pp. 59-72
Restricting attention to economic environments, we study implementation under perturbed better-response dynamics (BRD). A social choice function (SCF) is implementable in stochastically stable strategies of perturbed BRD whenever the only outcome supported by the stochastically stable strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009506456