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Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848306
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Delinquent networks
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 8 (2010) 1, pp. 34-61
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008649315
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Who's who in networks : wanted: the key player
Ballester, Coralio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003226129
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Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010294822
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Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647511
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Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003647589
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Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 101 (2008) 2, pp. 148-150
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003791200
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Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 2, pp. 508-548
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009755430
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Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011
We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009737511
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Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games
Peeters, Ronald; Vorsatz, Marc; Walzl, Markus - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009544505