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We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264924
This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274912
game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over firms: each worker … signalling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also … facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signalling mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737789
This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009011982
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782353
information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. In particular, we consider a two …-sided matching game of incomplete information between firms and workers. Each worker has either the same "typical" known preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014189212
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500203
Recent research has cast some doubt on the general validity of outcome-based models of social preferences. We develop a model based on cognitive dissonance that focuses on the importance of self-image. An experiment (a dictator game variant) tests the model. First, we find that subjects whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281679
This paper characterizes the equilibrium outcomes of two-stage games in which the second mover has private information … Delegation ; Renegotiation ; Asymmetric Information ; Renegotiation-Proofness ; Durability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009526574
In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that if players have an infinite depth of reasoning and this is commonly believed, types generically have a unique rationalizable action in games that satisfy a richness condition. We show that this result does not extend to environments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221860